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Scalar relationships between different levels of government have significant impacts on local 
government decision making. The impacts are pronounced in the context of resilience planning, 
where damage from disasters and local planning activities to mitigate them carry both state- and 
nation-wide consequences. Through the Community Rating System (CRS), a voluntary element of 
the National Flood Insurance Program, the federal government provides incentives for local 
governments to adopt additional mitigation activities that reduce flood risk. To examine how and 
the extent to which providing financial incentives proves effective in encouraging local governments 
to invest in resilience building is the underlying motivation of this thesis. 
This study has two research objectives. The first is to evaluate whether the CRS has been 
effective in incentivizing local governments to undertake additional mitigation activities. The second 
is to analyze whether existing scholarship on this topic have successfully modeled the functionalities 
of the CRS.  
Adopting a mixed methods approach using GIS-based and qualitative analysis through 
interviews to local, state, and federal government experts, this study found that local governments’ 
responses to this incentive are heavily reliant on their resources, geographic conditions and political 
capacity, and that the one-size-fits-all approach of the CRS created disproportionate impacts among 
urban and rural communities. Furthermore, findings revealed that much nuance and contextual 
information had been omitted in previous scholarship that relied solely on quantitative analysis.  The 
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Chapter 1. Background 
 
In the United States, administrating local-level planning activities is largely under the purview of 
local governments. At the same time, local governments are heavily influenced both by higher levels 
of government and by the public in their decision making.  
This scalar relationship is especially consequential in the context of resilience planning. The 
scope of planning activities to mitigate damage from disasters is local, but federal disaster assistance 
and the social and economic ripple effects caused by natural disasters make them national 
phenomena.  
This thesis focuses on the Community Rating System, an element of the National Flood 
Insurance Program, as a case of “a national government overtly subsidizing local governments to 
provide for the flood resilience commons” (Sadiq & Noonan, 2015a, p1416). This section briefly 
summarizes the National Flood Insurance Program and the Community Rating System as pertinent 
to this thesis. 
 
1.1 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
Historically, flood protection has been primarily provided through heavy infrastructure projects 
such as constructing dykes, levees, and seawalls. However, these have failed to reduce losses and 
have even created a false sense of safety that encouraged development in hazardous areas (FEMA, 
2011). Furthermore, the unpredictability and high risk of flooding prohibited commercial insurers 
from providing insurance at affordable rates.  
The National Flood Insurance Program was created by Congress in 1968 to provide affordable 
insurance to property owners and simultaneously promote building and zoning ordinances at the 
local level to reduce potential losses (FEMA, 2011). The program is administered by the Federal 




Subsequent amendments to the 1968 National Flood Insurance Act were made in order to 
increase the market penetration rate of flood insurance; the 1973 Flood Disaster Protection Act 
created mandatory insurance purchase requirements for homeowners taking out loans from federally 
regulated financial institutions. This was further strengthened in the 1994 National Flood Insurance 
Reform Act, which mandated insurance purchases for properties located in 100-year floodplains that 
received federal disaster assistance (Burby, 2001). Purchase rates among property owners remain 
low, however; as of 2016, only 12 percent of American homeowners had flood insurance (Insurance 
Information Institute, 2017). Over 22,200 communities have joined the NFIP (FEMA, 2017b). 
In order for residents to be eligible to buy insurance, communities1 enter into an agreement 
with the federal government to adopt and enforce a floodplain management ordinance that meet 
minimal federal requirements. States have played a role in expanding the NFIP by adopting state 
enabling legislations empowering local governments to adopt floodplain management ordinances, 
even sometimes mandating participation in the NFIP (Burby, 2001). 
However, studies have suggested that the mitigation requirements under the NFIP have not 
been effective in enhancing resilience: Holway and Burby (1993) found that floodplain elevation 
requirements under the NFIP did lower land values in floodplains but failed to discourage 
floodplain development, and called for land use regulations to limit floodplain occupancy. Other 
researchers have even pointed out that the NFIP often has the adverse effect of allowing local 
governments to facilitate floodplain development. Burby (2001) reported a 53 percent increase in 
floodplain development during the years that the NFIP had been in place and projected that 
floodplain occupancy will increase at the same rate as population increases. 
                                                
1 The term “community” is used in this thesis as it is defined by FEMA for NFIP purposes; it 
includes “incorporated city, town, township, borough, or village, or an unincorporated area of a 




1.2 The Community Rating System (CRS) 
One policy designed to incentivize NFIP communities to adopt mitigation activities beyond the 
minimum requirements is the Community Rating System (CRS), which has been a voluntary element 
of the NFIP since 1990. Under the CRS, communities may undertake additional mitigation activities 
in exchange for receiving insurance premium discounts for policyholders within their jurisdictions. 
Communities participating in the CRS receive points for each mitigation action they undertake, 
and policyholders become eligible for insurance premium reductions ranging from 5% to 45% of 
their insurance premiums, depending on the cumulative number of points they earn. Activities 
credited for CRS points are categorized into four groups; Public Information Activities, Mapping 
and Regulations, Flood Damage Prevention Activities, and Warning and Response. A full list of 
credited activities is shown in Appendix 1. Figure 1 shows the structure of the CRS point system. 
The highest class a community can achieve is Class 1, which offers a 45% discount on insurance 
premiums for property within 100 year floodplains, whereas the lowest is Class 10, which offers no 
discounts. The discount structure is tiered in that communities must earn points above the threshold 
required for each class to receive a larger discount. Once a community joins the program, they must 
commit to annual re-certifications to verify that they are implementing the activities they receive 
credits for. Additionally, audits are conducted every few years to review the activities and points 
earned (FEMA, 2017b). 
One of the notable aspects of the CRS is that although the incentive it offers are directed 
toward individual policyholders, the activities it promotes benefits a broader audience.  For example, 
outreach projects under the CRS are directed to both policyholders and non-policyholders alike, and 





As of 2017, 1,444 communities participate in the CRS. Although this accounts for only 5% of 
total NFIP communities, CRS communities include more than 69% of total NFIP policy holders 




Figure 1. CRS point system  
Source: FEMA (2017) 
Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) are areas identified by FEMA as 
having particularly high risk of flooding, with more than a one percent 





There is a growing body of research on the CRS. According to some researchers, communities 
with higher CRS scores indeed suffer less flood damage (Brody et al. 2007). However, others have 
pointed out that the point system of the CRS causes local governments to behave strategically by 
focusing on mitigation efforts that cost less and are more politically viable (Brody et al. 2009; Sadiq 
& Noonan, 2015a). Furthermore, Brody et al. (2007) warn that providing discounts for flood 
insurance creates a perverse incentive to build in floodplains, citing the fact that more than half of 
the wetland alteration permits in their study sample were in 100-year floodplains.  
 
A case of broader public policy 
Critics have pointed to the structural flaws of the NFIP for decades. For example, Burby (2001) 
raised the issue of the low market penetration rate, poor enforcement of elevation requirements, the 
inaccuracy of flood insurance rate maps, and their failure to reflect actuarial risk. In recent years, the 
increasing disasters resulting in large numbers of insurance payouts have forced the NFIP to carry a 
deficit of $25 billion (Leight, 2017). In a sense, the CRS is part of an already broken system. 
However, it deserves further scrutiny for a number of reasons. From a policy perspective, 
understanding the nested relationship between the different levels of government involved in this 
system will yield insights for designing public policy with scalar consequences. Furthermore, as will 
be discussed in the following sections, previous studies on the CRS have overlooked key elements of 
this system due to their methodology design. By redefining the CRS as a case of public policy in 
which the federal government subsidizes selected individuals in an attempt to encourage local 
governments to invest in resilience, this study delves into how local governments, sandwiched 








Chapter 2. Research question 
This thesis has two research objectives. The first is to evaluate the effectiveness of the CRS in 
encouraging local governments to adopt additional mitigation activities. Specifically, three factors are 
identified as the defining characteristics of this incentive; it is a federal government intervention 
designed to influence planning at the local level while bypassing several tiers of governments; it is 
voluntary and action-based in that communities can select whether and the extent to which they 
participate in the CRS; it requires local governments to invest in a public good in exchange for 
offering benefits to individuals. The study considers these three elements and how they affect local 
governments’ decision making.  
The second objective is to critically analyze the methodologies employed in existing scholarship 
on this topic.  Given the predominant use of non-spatial, statistical analysis in most previous 
research, this study evaluates whether this approach has been successful in modeling the actual 
functionalities of the CRS.  
The next section addresses the latter objective first by providing a review of existing literature 
on the CRS. The methodological limitations observed in these studies will be identified and used to 









Chapter 3. Literature Review  
Existing scholarship on the CRS can be broadly categorized into two groups. One attempts to 
evaluate the effect of mitigation activities in reducing flood losses. The other focuses on 
participating communities and aims to determine the factors that influence whether and the extent 
to which communities participate in the CRS. This literature review will first broadly summarize the 
two bodies of literature, then discuss the methodological constraints in both.  
 
3.1 Measuring the effectiveness of CRS 
Measuring the extent to which the CRS reduces flood losses has proven to be extremely 
difficult. A 2002 report by FEMA admitted that the effects of the CRS on flood losses and disaster 
savings are not easily quantifiable due to the diversity in the levels of exposure to flooding among 
counties, as well as in their built environments (FEMA, 2002).  
Nevertheless, a select number of researchers have accepted this challenge over the past decade. 
Brody et al. (2007) examined flood events between 1997 and 2001 in Florida to find that 
communities with higher CRS scores had less property damage caused by flooding. Another study 
that tracked a nationwide sample of 450 communities and their CRS activities from 1999 to 2009 
found that activities such as open space protection, freeboard requirements, and structural alteration 
such as retrofits significantly reduce flood damage (Highfield & Brody 2013). More recently, 
Highfield and Brody (2017) found that mere participation in the CRS was effective in reducing 
insured losses.  
In addition to these community-level studies, a parcel-level study by Highfield et al. (2014) was 
conducted on the Clear Creek watershed near Houston, Texas. They measured the effect of 
mitigation activities on insured losses in 9,555 parcels across 4 counties to find that specific CRS 




damage. While their study succeeded in conducting parcel level analysis more fine-grained than any 
previous research with the same purpose, their focus on a smaller geography significantly reduced 
the variation in CRS activities that were conducted in the selected counties, compromising its 
statistical reliability.  
Findings about specific mitigation activities that significantly reduce flood damage have been 
made on an individual study basis, but have not been consistent. On the other hand, all previous 
research found positive influence of the CRS in reducing flood damage. 
 
3.2 Characteristics of communities that participate in the CRS 
Other studies examined the characteristics that determine a community’s likelihood of 
participating in the CRS and their CRS scores, but obtained mixed and sometimes contradicting 
results.  For example, some studies affirmed that educational attainment was a positive predictor of 
CRS participation (for example, Posey, 2009), others have concluded the opposite (Landry & Li, 
2012). Furthermore, while some studies found that flood risk has a positive effect on CRS 
participation (Landry & Li, 2012; Posey, 2009; Sadiq & Noonan, 2015b), others found that it has no 
effect on CRS scores. (Paille et al. 2016) Not many variables are universal across studies to enable a 
cross comparison, thus some studies and their methodologies are outlined below. 
 A study conducted by Sadiq and Noonan (2015b) using a nationwide sample found local 
government payroll, flood risk2, socioeconomic factors3, and “political-economy factors4” to have a 
significant relationship with CRS participation. They also discovered that elements affecting CRS 
participation did not necessarily affect CRS scores. For example, the percentage of the population 
                                                
2 This included the “percentage of the community area covered by water” and “humidity”. They 
concluded that more humidity in areas with milder topography are predictors of CRS participation. 
3 For example, the share of white population and share of the population under age 18. 




without a high school degree was not a significant predictor of CRS participation, but showed a 
negative relationship with CRS scores.  
On the other hand, Paille et al. (2016) examined CRS participation and scores of parishes in 
South Louisiana and concluded that higher CRS scores were associated with higher median housing 
values but not with flood risk5. They also found a significant positive relationship between the 
number of nested municipalities within the parishes and CRS scores of the parish.  
Another quantitative analysis by Landry et al. (2012) had opposite results; after examining CRS 
participation for all 100 counties in North Carolina from 1991 to 2002, they found that higher 
educational attainment reduces a county’s likelihood of participation. They also found that flood 
experience in the past year and median household income had no effect on CRS participation, 
whereas housing unit density, proportion of the county areas covered by water bodies, and 
precipitation were positive predictors. Conversely, Posey (2009) examined municipalities nationwide 
to find that educational attainment positively affects CRS participation, as do the percentage of the 
white population and average income.  
Lastly, some researchers investigated the effect of the incentive structure of the CRS on local 
governments’ participation. Sadiq & Noonan (2015a) found that communities respond strategically 
to the non-linear incentive structure of the CRS; at lower CRS classes, communities with less 
exposure to flood risk, property values, government capacity, and population densities tend to be 
more responsive, earning just enough points to pass the threshold for remaining in their CRS class, 
whereas at higher CRS class levels, communities with higher property values tend to be more 
responsive. Another study by Zahran et al. (2010) found that mitigation activities stall after 
communities pass a threshold for insurance premium discounts, and that the likelihood of stalling 
                                                




increases as their CRS class rises. They also found that communities more covered by floodplains 
tend to have lower CRS points.  
 
Limitations of the existing literature 
The mixed and contradicting results of previous scholarship on predicting CRS participation 
and CRS scores suggest that the findings are more a function of methodology than of reality. Many 
of the previous studies suffer from three major limitations.  
The first is the dismissal of context and nuance. Figure 2 shows the relationships between the 
different levels of government that influence the CRS system. Flood insurance is provided at the 
federal level (FEMA) to individual policyholders, as are the discounts. Some states are authorized by 
FEMA to fulfill FEMA’s responsibilities and provide technical support and inspections to CRS 
communities. States also formulate and enforce regulations that apply to all jurisdictions within the 
state. Counties and incorporated jurisdictions such as cities and towns conduct CRS activities 
separately in most cases, and are considered separate communities by FEMA. Furthermore, within 
these CRS communities, various stakeholders including elected officials, public sector planners, the 
development community, and homeowners with various ideologies of property rights, all influence 








Few studies have successfully considered this nested and scalar relationship that influences the 
efficacy of the CRS as a planning incentive. Most previous research conducted quantitative analyses 
in which individual communities were represented as discrete features with a set of numerical 
attributes that merely offered slices of the socioeconomic and physical characteristics of residents 
within their jurisdiction.  By extracting CRS communities as independent observations, floating 
entities free of regulatory interventions from higher levels of government or bottom-up pressure 
from local constituents, many analyses have overlooked the complexities inherent in this multi-
stakeholder and highly political intervention.  





Furthermore, their reliance on solely quantitative research diminished the possibility of their 
identifying the qualitative elements that may have been influencing their results. All previous 
research employed statistical analyses that first listed possible factors that may be affecting the 
dependent variable, then ran the model to see which ones were significant. This approach did not 
provide room to consider any element other than the ones included in their initial hypotheses. 
The second limitation stems from the first and involves the selection and transformation of 
data. Citing the lack of finer-grained data, many studies conducted statistical analyses after either 
aggregating all data to the county level (for example, Brody et al., 2009, 2007; Fan et al., 2016; Li, 
2012; Zahran et al., 2010) or using the median data for the county to analyze data for smaller 
jurisdictions (Sadiq et al., 2015a, 2015b). Some studies even focused solely on counties, whose CRS 
activities only apply to the unincorporated areas in the county, while using countywide 
socioeconomic data (Brody, 2007; Landry et al. 2012). Considering the structure of the CRS where 
counties and incorporated jurisdictions should be analyzed as individual entities, careless selection 
and transformation of data fundamentally skews the results of any statistical analysis.  
The last and most consequential mistake that many have made is to overlook the importance of 
location. To my knowledge, not one study employed mapping as part of its methodology. This 
approach is dangerous for many reasons. First, it dismisses the spatial relationships between the 
variables that are being analyzed. Finding that risk and median income both positively affect the 
likelihood of a community to participate in the CRS is important, but this does not allow for 
distinguishing whether there are CRS communities with both high risk and high income, or whether 
there are two types of CRS communities, one with high risk, and the other with high income. It goes 
without saying that making this distinction is crucial considering their implications for policy 
making. Ignoring location also discounts the geographic aspects of a place-based natural disaster that 




Wachs (1982) cautions against the use of overly simple or overly complex models for 
forecasting. He argues that simplistic models of complex urban phenomena suffer from 
specification errors, failing to “represent the processes by which outcomes are actually determined” 
(Wachs, 1982, p254), while complex models and their use of more variables and equations are 
subject to measurement errors that rapidly escalate with the increased number of variables.  
Previous scholarship on the CRS suffer from both. By dismissing the complex details inherent 
in governmental decision making processes, they failed to accurately model the process of CRS. 
Furthermore, their reliance on statistical analyses using large numbers of variables that have been 
incorrectly manipulated have exacerbated the measurement errors.  
This research seeks to revisit the topic of CRS while avoiding the methodological flaws in 
previous studies. First, location will be considered through a GIS-based mapping analysis. Second, 
















Chapter 4. Methodology 
This study focuses on communities in North Carolina.  The geographic conditions of the state 
make them vulnerable to both coastal and riverine flooding, and the state has one of the highest 
numbers of CRS communities in the country (FEMA, 2015).  
Figure 3 shows the Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in North Carolina. SFHAs are areas 
identified by FEMA as having a particularly high risk of flooding, with more than a one percent 
chance of flooding on a given year.  
The locations of communities who have participated in the CRS since 1990 are mapped in 
Figure 4. Of the 580 communities participating in the NFIP, 87, or 15%, are CRS communities. 
 
 






4-1. GIS-based analysis 
The first half of the methodology consists of examining whether there are relationships 
between the spatial distributions of selected physical and socioeconomic variables and the locations 
of jurisdictions that participate in the CRS.  
The analysis uses 1990 decennial census data per block group. The time frame is selected based 
on the fact that a majority of CRS communities in North Carolina entered the program between 
1990 and 1999; selecting the year closest to the start of the program will enable analysis of the 
underlying socioeconomic conditions before the policy was implemented.  
Variables were selected based on the findings of previous research; they include median built 
year, median household income, median housing value, population density, percentage of population 
with a bachelor’s degree or above, percentage of population over 65 years old, percentage of 
population that are white, and percentage of rental units.  




In order to consider flood risk, the percentage of land area covered by Special Flood Hazard 
Areas is also mapped per block group, using data from FEMA. This is based on the findings of 
Highfield & Brody (2013) and Highfield et al. (2014) that a community’s exposure to SFHAs or 




Table 1. Data sources 
 
After mapping the raw values for each variable, additional analyses were conducted to detect 
patterns in the spatial distributions of the values by abstracting them to clusters of high and low 
values. As a preliminary step, a Global Moran’s I test was conducted for each variable to detect the 
Variable Operational definition Source and Years 
   









U.S. Census Bureau, 
1990 
Median income Median household income in 1989 Dollars 
Median value Median value for specified owner-occupied housing 
units 
Median built year Median of the built year of structures within the block 
group 
Percent college Percentage of the population with bachelor’s degrees 
or higher 
Percent white Percentage of the population who are white 
Percent over 65 Percentage of the population over 65 years old 





Percentage of the block group area within the 100-year 
floodplain 
 
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2017 
 CRS participation by community 





presence of spatial clusters6. After significant spatial autocorrelation was evident, a Getis-Ord Gi* 
analysis was conducted in order to map the locations of the clusters. Finally, maps showing the 
location of communities participating in the CRS was overlaid onto these hotspot maps to analyze 
the relationship between communities’ socioeconomic characteristics and their CRS participation.  
 
4-2. Interviews 
The second portion of this study consists of interviews to planners and floodplain 
administrators in counties, cities, and towns within North Carolina, as well as state- and federal-level 
experts. Planners in 15 jurisdictions in North Carolina were interviewed. In some instances, planners 
oversaw both the unincorporated areas in the county and incorporated jurisdictions.  
All interviews to local level planners were semi-structured interviews using a questionnaire 
(Appendix 2) and additional visual aids used to facilitate the discussion in some cases. Interviewees 
from CRS communities were first asked questions on the community’s CRS participation status and 
what the benefits and costs were to participating in the CRS. Non-CRS communities were asked 
about the frequency of discussions within the government about participating in the CRS and what 
the main barriers to participating were. All interviewees were then asked to read two statements to 
which they would answer on a scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. They were then asked to 
elaborate on their answers. Finally, interviewees were asked to view figures showing the location of 
CRS communities overlaid on maps of population density, elderly population, and SFHA coverage, 
and were asked why they thought the locations of CRS-participating counties were distributed as 
they were. This last step was sometimes omitted due to technical issues or lack of time. 
                                                
6 “Contiguity edges corners” was utilized as the method to conceptualize spatial relationships 
between features. This option avoids making assumptions about how close features should be in 
order to affect values in other features. Row standardization was not applied after confirming that 




All interviews were conducted over the telephone using materials sent prior to the interviews 
via email. The interviews ranged from less than 20 minutes to over one hour. The communities’ 
CRS participation status is shown in Figure 5. There were three cases in which the respondents 
served as the floodplain managers for multiple jurisdictions, and they were given multiple votes. 
 
Figure 5. Respondents’ participation status in the CRS 
  
 
The two interviews with State and FEMA officials were unstructured interviews conducted over 
the telephone, both ranging for one hour. The interview with the State official focused on the State’s 
role in the NFIP and CRS and local level decision making processes in participating in the CRS. The 
interview with the FEMA official focused on the aim of the NFIP and CRS, the efficacy of how the 
CRS is designed and implemented, implications for CRS at the local government level, and the 
difficulties of quantifying damage from disasters.  
Since all interviews were semi-structured or unstructured, they yielded information not directly 
related to the questions but nevertheless beneficial in analyzing the efficacy of the CRS. Content 
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Chapter 5. Findings 
 
5-1. GIS-based analysis 
 
Results of the Global Moran’s I test are summarized in Table 2. This tests for clusters of higher 
or lower than average values, and the Moran’s I index ranges from -1 to 1. A positive Moran’s I 
index indicates that block groups with high or low values are located near other block groups with 
high or low values, and a negative index shows that high or low values tend to repel other high or 
low values.   
All variables except Percent SFHA showed statistically significant clustering with positive z-
scores.  Apart from Percent Over 65, block groups with higher or lower than average values are 
clustered together with other higher or lower values. This is understandable, since urban areas 
spanning over multiple block groups will form spatial clusters of high population density, typically 
high median incomes and median housing values, high educational attainment and higher 
percentages of rental units. Median built year is also significant although the lower z score indicates 
that the clustering is not as strong as the other variables. The negative Moran’s I index for Percent 
Over 65 indicates that areas with high percentages of elderly populations tend to be near areas that 
have smaller percentages of elderly populations. 
Lastly, the Moran’s I test showed no statistically significant clustering for Percent SFHA.  
 
 
Table 2: Global Moran’s I test for block groups in North Carolina, 1990. 


















Moran's I 0.546* 0.536* 0.525* 0.136* 0.578* 0.641* -0.369* 0.469* 0.000384 
z-score 73.0 71.6 70.1 18.4 77.2 85.5 49.3 62.5 0.891 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.929 






Next, a Getis-Ord Gi* analysis was conducted to map the locations of the clusters7.  Block 
groups mapped as hotspots are ones that themselves have high values and are also contiguous to 
block groups with high values. The inverse stands for cold spots; they are block groups with low 
values contiguous to block groups with similarly low values. Results are shown in Figures 6 through 
14. The first map in each Figure shows the raw values for each variable, the second map shows the 
hotspots and cold spots, and the third shows CRS communities isolated within the second map. 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of block groups covered by 100-year floodplains. Hotspots of 
block groups containing more SFHAs are clustered mostly on the coast with some scattered inland, 
presumably showing areas vulnerable to coastal and riverine flooding respectively. Although there 
are CRS communities in coastal areas with high clusters of floodplains, other CRS communities are 
not necessarily near clusters of floodplains. CRS communities located inland where there are no 
significant clusters of floodplains imply that risk is not the only determinant of CRS participation.  
Figure 7 offers an explanation for this pattern; areas with high population density tend to be 
CRS communities. On the other hand, areas with significantly low population density were not 
necessarily non-CRS communities; coastal areas and communities in the southeast portion of the 
state had low population density but participated in the CRS. Figures 8 through 11 showing median 
income, median home values, educational attainment, and percentage of rental units offer similar 
insights. Other variables were less clear. Figure 12 shows that areas with lower percentages of elderly 
population tend to be CRS communities, and vice versa. There was no discernible relationship 
between the percentage of white population and CRS communities, or between median built year 
and CRS communities (Figures 13 and 14). 
                                                
7	The tests were not corrected for false discovery rates, thus the statistical significance of the results 




Overall, CRS communities can be categorized into two distinct groups. One includes 
communities along the coast with large areas located in floodplains. These tended to have lower 
population density, median incomes, home values, educational attainment, and lower percentage of 
rental units. The other category includes communities located inland with relatively little flood risk, 




















































Findings from interviews to local, state, and federal experts are summarized below, categorized 
by common themes. All interviewees are kept anonymous.  
 
The costs and benefits CRS participation 
 
Almost all interviewees in CRS communities listed staff time and financial resources as the 
primary cost of participating in the CRS. These include the procedural work associated with the CRS 
such as the annual recertification and the audit every few years from FEMA, as well as the actual 
mitigation work required for earning points such as community outreach and mapping. FEMA’s 
altering the allocation of points every three years further burdened them with the task of keeping up 
to date with the calculation procedures so as to avoid a reduction in their points. There were 
instances where a change in the calculation system threatened to lower a community’s class, 
necessitating them to conduct additional mitigation activities in order to offset the decrease. Many 
interviewees also indicated that the staff time required would increase as they moved up to a higher 
class, since more activities are required to gain higher points. On the other hand, a few interviewees 
saw no additional cost to their local government; a respondent from an incorporated jurisdiction 
commented that the county was already conducting most of the activities necessary for the 
community to obtain their current class, and that the county supported them through the application 
process as well.  
As for the benefits, there was a stark contrast between interviewees that listed insurance 
premium discounts as the primary, if not the sole benefit, while a few others stressed the enhanced 
resilience as the most valuable outcome of CRS participation. One respondent explicitly denied that 




CRS is ensuring the safety and well-being of your citizens. The number one thing is protecting 
people, property, and the environment”. They listed political support for the mitigation activities as 
the second benefit, and the reduction in premiums as the third. One respondent also listed the 
benefits of educational component of the outreach projects under the CRS. Citing the influx of 
retirees in the county, they stressed the importance of educating new residents of the flood risk in 
the area. 
For some respondents, insurance premium discounts had a hidden additional benefit: to make 
CRS “a good tool to convince elected officials” to participate in the CRS. As another respondent 
explained,  
 
“You have to look at it from the political side. Basically to sell it to the elected 
officials, the very base thing is that it saves money for their constituents. But our 
tone was that incidentally we’re saving money, but more importantly we’re making 
our communities safer. For us, that’s the key understanding. We do care about the 
savings but for us it’s actually the implementation of the program component to 
make communities safer.”  
 
Reframing the premium discounts as money that stays in the community was also a tactic used 
by the state employee to convince local elected officials. 
 
Barriers to CRS participation for non-CRS communities 
 
Figure 15 shows the response from interviewees in non-CRS communities asked how often 
joining the CRS was discussed within their local government. One respondent answered “Rarely to 




having active discussions about joining the CRS. Respondents from non-CRS communities 
unanimously cited the lack of staff time and resources as a deterrent to joining the CRS. Allocating 
more staff to mitigation activities was not considered financially feasible especially where planning is 
“not a priority”. One respondent pointed to floodplain managers in smaller jurisdictions already 
having multiple titles and responsibilities, which would inhibit them from justifying the additional 
cost of CRS participation. Other communities were even moving in the opposite direction; one 
planner mentioned that their community was having their flood maps changed from 2019 to move 
some properties outside the floodplain, thus no longer requiring the owners to purchase flood 
insurance.  
 
Figure 15. How often is participating in the CRS discussed? 
 
Other hurdles to CRS participation included opposition from residents and the resulting lack of 
political will. When asked who the major opponents would be if they were to adopt more stringent 











“The public, really. We live in a pretty small town, so when things like this occur, 
people will go to the elected officials and make a case for it not to happen. … what it 
boils down to is the public’s perception or fear of increased regulations”.  
 
Another respondent provided another explanation; small communities that rely on new 
development to generate employment and provide a tax base for the jurisdiction will avoid having 
more stringent regulations under the CRS for fear of deterring new development. Although this was 
not confirmed through interviews with non-CRS communities, a similar concern was shared with 
some CRS communities. 
 
Finding the Equilibrium 
 Both CRS and non-CRS communities conducted their respective versions of cost-benefit 
analysis to decide whether and the extent to which they would participate in the CRS. One 
respondent from a community no longer in the CRS cited the number of policyholders being too 
small to justify the additional cost and staff time required to remain in the program. Overall, 
respondents had difficulty justifying efforts to move to a higher class or join the CRS unless they 
saw other benefits than the discounts; one respondent from a CRS community noted that the actual 
cost to the county government to implement activities under the CRS would not be penciled out by 
the premium discounts that the residents enjoy, and that the “losses avoided” must be factored in to 
make it cost-justifiable. This was also true for another non-CRS community that nevertheless had 
high standards equivalent to other CRS communities in the county. For them, the only additional 
benefit of joining the CRS would be the premium discounts, which would not pencil out the burden 




  The local political climate and ideologies over property rights were also a major factor in the 
decision making process; one respondent described concerns among the elected officials over having 
to “restrict development to the degree necessary to warrant the increase in CRS rating”, and that 
their maintaining the current class is a “we’re happy with what we have, kind of scenario”. They 
were not unique; another respondent whose community was in the process of becoming a CRS 
community also stated that they were merely joining to get credit and insurance discounts for the 
activities already being conducted, and had no intention of moving to a higher class.  
 One respondent hinted that the CRS was not actively publicized in the county due to elected 
officials being afraid of citizens pressuring the government to increase the county’s rating. Indeed, 
very few interviewees expected residents to know about the CRS system and associated premium 
discounts. They described the situation; 
 
“We don’t really advertise it a lot, so a lot of our citizens aren’t aware we’re even 
doing this in the background. They just reap the benefits of the reduction of their 
insurance rates but they’re not really sure why.” 
 
 There were only two jurisdictions actively advertising the CRS, and both indicated that they 
would continue to move to a higher class. This lack of advertising, whether intentional or accidental, 
was also acknowledged by the FEMA interviewee, who also pointed out that the concept of CRS 
was too complicated to explain to the regular consumer and that it was best described as “humming 







CRS and flood damage 
 Figure 16 shows interviewees’ responses to the statement: The CRS helps to reduce damage from 
flooding, categorized by the CRS status of the respondents’ jurisdictions. Where respondents oversaw 
two jurisdictions, they were given two votes. One interviewee responded with two answers (unsure 
and agree), and these were each counted as half a vote.  
 
Figure 16. The CRS helps to reduce damage from flooding. 
	 
 Overall, both CRS and non-CRS communities agreed with the statement. One interviewee 
did not know what the CRS entailed, thus was not asked this question.  
Interviewees who answered “agree” had several concerns that precluded them from giving a 
stronger affirmative answer. One respondent pointed out the lack of accuracy in the maps showing 





















areas outside of mapped floodplains. Another expressed concerns regarding pre-FIRM buildings8 
that were outside the purview of the CRS. One interviewee pointed to their community’s lack of 
capacity to hire full-time staff to oversee the CRS activities, lamenting, “having a plan is awesome, 
but having the resources to implement those plans are key to making real-world things happen.”  
 Both respondents9 in CRS communities who answered “strongly agree” had previously listed 
multiple benefits under the CRS such as higher regulations and information dissemination. One of 
the interviewees stated that the jurisdiction had been implementing all the point-earning activities in 














                                                
8 Buildings constructed before the initial Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) were made. Although 
they are often structurally vulnerable, subsidized rates for flood insurance are offered.  





CRS and development in floodplains 
 Fig 17 shows interviewees’ responses to the statement: The CRS helps to incentivize communities 
to reduce development in flood-prone areas (Special Flood Hazard Areas). 
 
Figure 17. The CRS helps to incentivize communities to reduce development in flood-prone 
areas (Special Flood Hazard Areas). 
 
 Unlike the previous statement, the responses were divided. Overall, a majority of CRS 
communities agreed with the statement, with two exceptions. One respondent from a CRS 
community explicitly stated that they did not want to reduce development, but instead work towards 
“resilient development.” Their jurisdiction was facing a difficult situation; virtually the whole 
community is in a 100-year flood zone, thus inaction is not an option. The poverty rate is also high, 
and residents need access to affordable insurance. The CRS is helpful in reducing premiums, but too 
much commitment under the CRS would imply hindering development by raising the cost of 
building in floodplains. This posed a structural problem. As a result, they were forced to walk “a fine 



















non-CRS respondent stated that even if they were a CRS community, they would not limit 
development, since “people want to be around water, and this [community] is not going to pass any 
kind of regulation that’s going to prevent anybody from building a home.” The respondent who 
answered “disagree” cited the general negative sentiment towards government intervention 
regarding property rights as the main deterrent to limiting development. Even the respondent who 
answered “strongly agree” identified barriers to limiting development in floodplains, which becomes 
“a larger policy issue that perhaps [elected] officials might have to address”. 
 
The cumbersome processes of the CRS 
 There was a wariness among respondents of having to follow the prescriptive procedures of 
the CRS; for example, one interviewee wished that the program were more “streamlined” and “user-
friendly”. Another respondent commented that their efforts might be “more innovative than the 
CRS program allows,” citing an instance in which they thought the FEMA-prescribed methods of 
community outreach − brochures and newsletters − were obsolete in a society where more people 
look to television or social media for information. However, they were forced to conduct outreach 
by both means in order to earn CRS points and to ensure that it was effective.  
 One non-CRS respondent pointed to their jurisdiction already having the same high 
standards as surrounding CRS communities, and that participating in the CRS and needing to pay 
attention to point-earning activities would be “taking away from what the staff members need to be 
doing, which is spending their time reviewing permits”. In their view, participating would force them 
to “spend so much time keeping score, we don’t have time to play the game”.  
 On the other hand, efforts were being made to assist local floodplain managers with the 
CRS; the state official working on behalf of FEMA commented that their Division of Emergency 




managers. Indeed, many local level respondents expressed their appreciation of technical support 
and responsiveness from the state level. The state also plays a role in promoting the CRS, such as 
mentioning the CRS in their Model Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance to increase local 
governments’ exposure to the program and allow them to understand which elements need to be 
added to their ordinance in order for them to be eligible for certain CRS points. The state employee 
was also personally made the effort to meet local government officials to convince them to 
participate in the program.  
 
The urban-rural divide 
 Many respondents suggested that participation in the CRS is not only a function of risk but 
of local financial resources, or as one respondent put it, it “just depends on how big the city is.” 
Others pointed to CRS communities inland having higher levels of education and acceptance of 
larger government; one respondent commented that counties inland were the more urban areas, 
where “citizens probably tend to understand what higher regulation is”. As one respondent 
summarized;  
 
“People in North Carolina especially on the coast and in the mountains are very pro-
property rights and very anti-government, and don’t want anything to do with them. 
And it’s funny because the places that are in the CRS program are at a lot lower risk 
from flooding, but they have more educated people, more money, higher earnings, 
… All those [cities inland] are relatively speaking high-wealth compared to the rest of 
the state. So not only do they typically have educated people because they are higher 
wealth, but they have the money to do some of these programs. …Charlotte, they 




stuff. I don’t see a day where [] or [] ever doing that, although I think it would be 
wonderful”.  
 
 The issue of urban areas having more resources and acceptance of government regulations 
was apparent at the intra-county level as well; there are instances where the county does not 
participate in the CRS but have nested municipalities that are CRS communities. Respondents 
expressed concern for this trend, sighing that residents in the unincorporated areas were “your most 
rural people, and probably the people that need [the CRS] the most”.  
 
Constraints from higher levels of government 
 Conducting mitigation activities is a local responsibility. However, some communities were 
capped at certain CRS classes due to no fault of their own. Prerequisites exist that must be filled in 
order for communities to move to higher CRS classes, and some state-legislated regulations do not 
fulfill the CRS mandate. Therefore, unless county-level governments have regulations that meet the 
requirements under the CRS, counties and their incorporated jurisdictions cannot move to a higher 
class. There are prerequisites for moving to classes 6, 4, and 1(FEMA, 2017b). 
 
Past disaster experiences 
 Multiple respondents pointed to past flood experiences functioning as focus events pushing 
communities to adopt more mitigation activities. One respondent from a community in the process 
of participating in the CRS noted that experiencing Hurricane Matthew in 2016 made the 
community aware of their lack of preparation and need for lower insurance premiums, which 




recalled eating out of the American Red Cross truck for a month after Hurricane Isabel hit their 
community in 2003, and experience that convinced them to “rebuild stronger” after every disaster. 
 
The point system  
 Although the way points were allocated across different mitigation activities was sometimes 
viewed as “arbitrary” from the local governments’ perspective, it had some notable upsides from a 
policy design standpoint.  First, it provides the flexibility for the federal government to favor 
mitigation activities that are proven to be more effective by allocating more earnable points to those 
activities. The FEMA employee recalled changing the point allocation system in 2011 to increase the 
earnable points for open space preservation after an extensive deliberation with other officials and 
experts revealed that communities with larger areas of open space had fewer damage. Second, in 
light of the politically sensitive nature of discussions related to increased risk of flooding from 
climate change, the CRS’s focus on activities implemented shifts the argument away from what the 
causes are to what the actions should be. As the FEMA respondent described this convenient 
nature; 
 
 “the CRS really recognizes incremental practices that a community implements. The 
cause of those flood characteristics is less important. There is increased risk, and you 
need to do something about it. Whether you think it’s because of climate change, or 
it’s just within the normal cycle of weather patterns, or changes of land use, 







CRS and environmental justice 
 There is one disturbing aspect of the CRS. According to FEMA employees, the insurance 
premium revenue to FEMA is reduced by $300 million because of the reductions offered under 
CRS. However, this is offset by increasing the price of policies for both CRS and non-CRS 





















Chapter 6. Discussion 
6.1 The efficacy of the CRS  
 Findings from the GIS-based analysis and interviews suggested that the question of whether 
the CRS encourages local governments to adopt more mitigation activities should be answered in 
multiple ways. The section below addresses the efficacy and implications of the CRS, grouped by the 
perspectives through which the CRS may be viewed.  
 
6.1.1 Federal government intervention to influence local planning 
 As a case of the federal government intervening in local planning activities, findings 
highlighted some major difficulties caused by bypassing state and county governments; cities and 
towns that rely on county governments for some of the mitigation activities are constrained to 
county ordinances; this precludes them from fulfilling some of the prerequisites for moving up 
above certain classes. Without measures in place to coordinate between the multiple levels of 
government, this cannot be reconciled. 
 Furthermore, as was evident by FEMA’s decision to offset the reduction in insurance 
premiums by raising the base rate of insurance for policyholders nationally10, the CRS creates a zero-
sum game which both CRS and non-CRS communities are forced to play11. This has serious 
environmental justice implications in light of the fact that lack of resources was one of the primary 
reasons for non-participation, and that some communities conduct the same level of mitigation 
activities without joining the CRS in order to avoid the massive administrative costs required to 
participate.  This issue also points to the disturbing fact that the CRS, or rather the NFIP, would fall 
                                                
10 This excludes 20% of policies insuring older structures in flood-prone areas for subsidized rates. 
11 As of 2017, the average premium for full-risk policies is $700. Policyholders have seen their base 




apart if all communities were to participate, since there would be no community to subsidize CRS 
communities. 
 
6.1.2 Individual benefits versus the public good 
 FEMA’s intention behind the CRS may have been to encourage investing in building 
resilience for the general public. In many cases however, this was not how it was conceptualized on 
the ground.  
 While some communities recognized the benefits of mitigation activities to their residents as 
a whole, others merely valued the premium discounts, and the difference in how the benefits were 
understood greatly affected the amount of resilience activities undertaken.  Communities that 
recognized the insurance premium discounts as the sole benefits were having difficulty justifying the 
staff time required to keep it up; some even viewed this as an incorrect way to use taxpayers’ money, 
since they were directing what limited staff time there was available to an effort that “would only 
benefit” insurance policyholders, of which there were few. In contrast, communities that recognized 
the positive externalities of mitigation activities, most of them shared by an audience not limited to 
insurance policyholders, were also enthusiastic about continually moving to a higher class. 
 Both cases contain wider implications from a planning ethics perspective. Kelman (1982) 
argues that the mere attempt to put a dollar value on non-marketed benefits or costs would devalue 
them, and that decisions regarding environmental regulations should not be made based on the 
benefits-outweigh-costs test. For communities who only saw the benefit in the premium reductions, 
it is no doubt necessary to create a common understanding of the positive externalities of the CRS. 
However, from an ethical standpoint, this should not be quantified and weighed against the staff 




 Furthermore, the individual benefits not being recognized by their recipients in the first 
place implies that there is almost no bottom-up pressure from residents to adopt more mitigation 
activities under the CRS. In some cases, local governments were making sure not to advertise the 
CRS in order to prevent this from occurring. 
 Some notable findings were the strategic actions of planners in communities whose elected 
bodies were reluctant to participate in the CRS. Howe & Kaufman (1982) identify three key roles in 
planners; the technician, the politician, and the hybrid. The technician values “the efficacy of analysis 
and its value neutrality” (Howe & Kaufman, 1982, p41) and are more loyal to their agency. On the 
other hand, the planner as politician is more value-committed and attempts to work within the 
political system of his agency in favor of what he believes to better serve the public interest. 
Findings revealed that not a small number of planners were acting as politicians. One respondent 
from a non-CRS community whose community already had high standards but did not want to 
participate in the CRS said that as long as the higher standards were in place, they would “fight for 
them to the end to try not to incorporate CRS” in order to avoid the extra costs, but that if 
standards were lowered they “would come back in after the fact and implement the CRS program.”  
 
6.1.3 Limitations of a voluntary and action-based incentive 
 The voluntary nature of the CRS, and the flexibility awarded to communities to choose their 
own mitigation activities, created some significant effects on how and which communities 
participated in the CRS. 
 Often times the communities eager to participate and advance their CRS classes were not the 
ones facing higher flood risk. Findings point to a significant cluster of urban areas with the financial 
resources and political will to take advantage of the CRS, enabling them to not only participate in the 




contrast, while some lower-income communities where the cost of flood insurance is a heavy burden 
on residents participate because they “cannot afford not to”, other rural areas were discouraged by 
the large amount of staff time associated with the CRS and the anti-regulatory sentiment among the 
public and elected officials’ avoidance of impinging on individual property rights. For the same 
reason, some county governments placed CRS participation under the responsibility of the 
incorporated municipalities. Even within a county, investing in the resilience commons is a luxury 
only afforded by the relatively urban areas.  
 Furthermore, the communities that did participate were finding their respective “balancing 
points” for CRS participation. In most cases, the incentives under the CRS was insufficient in 
encouraging local governments to continue aiming higher; the extent to which communities 
conducted mitigation activities under the CRS was determined by government resources, various 
“cost-benefit analyses”, past flood experience, regulatory constraints imposed by higher level 
governments, public sentiment, and political will. Therefore, potential applications of CRS to build 
long-term resilience through directing development away from hazardous areas seems unrealistic; 
interviewees mentioned that the mere possibility that CRS involves interfering with property rights 
or development costs caused elected officials to avoid participating in the CRS altogether. 
Ultimately, local governments are free to pick and choose. 
 
6.2 The methodological question 
 This section seeks to complement existing literature by using the findings from this study to 







6.2.1 The role of contextual information  
 Communities participated in the CRS for various reasons; some communities chose to do 
the “low-hanging fruit” that earned points for little staff time; some took advantage of the vast open 
space within their jurisdiction and actively pursued activities that accounted for many points; some 
were conducting mitigation activities prior to joining the CRS and had no intention of doing more to 
move to a higher class. The complex environments in which local planners were placed to make 
decisions on CRS activities offer an explanation for the findings by Sadiq & Noonan (2015b) that 
factors related to CRS participation are not necessarily the factors that explain CRS scores.  
 Very few, if any, of these motives can be quantified. This study also identified that 
governmental capacities and residents’ sentiments toward increased regulations, both of which are 
difficult to find accurate proxies for, played an important role in the decision making processes. 
Another finding that should inform assumptions for further research is the fact that there is no 
evidence of bottom-up pressure from residents to participate in the CRS. This largely discredits 
discussions assuming otherwise (for example, Landry & Li, 2012; Sadiq & Noonan, 2015b).  
 
6.2.2 Handling contextual data 
 Findings also revealed major issues created by data handling procedures in previous 
scholarship. One example is the use of CRS points as a variable. A number of studies utilized CRS 
points as a continuous variable in their statistical models (for example, Brody et al., 2009, 2007; 
Highfield & Brody, 2017; Highfield et al., 2014; Paille et al., 2016; Sadiq & Noonan, 2015a, 2015b; 
Zahran et al., 2010). However, given that scoring systems are subject to change every few years, do 
not reflect the communities’ annual mitigation activities, or that point allocation does not seem to be 




variable representations of mitigation efforts; they are the sum of arbitrarily defined and earned 
evaluations that happened to be in numeric format, and should have been treated as such.  
 The use of insured losses to measure the effectiveness of mitigation activities, while 
understandable considering the lack of accurate data on losses (Burby, 2005), does not represent the 
total losses experienced by a community, especially considering the low insurance take-up rate. It 
also runs the risk of obscuring the fact that mitigation activities benefit those who do not have 
insurance, an aspect that is often difficult to quantify, but nevertheless recognized by some planners. 
 Finally, the shocking divide among urban and rural CRS communities emphasizes the 
serious consequences of county-wide data aggregation conducted in previous scholarship. Instances 
exist where counties with little resources cannot afford to participate in the CRS while their 
incorporated municipalities can, but a number of research overlooked this phenomenon citing the 
lack of municipal-scale data, and simply used county medians or came up with ways to population-
adjust CRS scores.  
 
6.2.3 The importance of location 
 Many of the previous research comparing flood damage among CRS communities suffered 
from the confounding variable problem; while some were able to show that CRS participating 
communities have suffered smaller losses by disasters, they failed to consider the possibility that 
there is an external factor influencing both a community’s decision to participate in CRS and their 
experienced damage from flooding.  
 This study found that there is such an external factor. That two types of CRS communities 
with opposite socioeconomic characteristics exist requires such confounding variable considerations 
to be made in order to accurately account for other factors influencing flood damage. For example, 




and negative predictors of CRS participation only explains rural CRS communities, and misses the 
presence of a significant group of CRS communities with high educational attainment and low flood 
risk.  
 The dismissal of location and geographic context rendered some findings inconsequential; 
interview respondents indicated that the selection of mitigation activities they undertake are heavily 
reliant on local geographic context. Therefore, findings that suggest some activities reduce flood 
losses more than others are, while interesting, are not very helpful for communities without the 
geographical conditions that enable such activities.  
 
6.2.4 The dangers of relying on complex models 
 These findings reinforce the critique by Wachs (1982) of complex models in forecasting as 
applied to attempts to quantitatively model social phenomena; “Complex models are attractive for 
tactical reasons. They appear to be sophisticated and for this reason lend credibility to the advice 
given by those who understand them. Their very complexity makes it difficult to criticize or question 
their validity. In reality, they may be no more valid than very simple forecasting models which 
require less technical expertise.” (Wachs, 1982, p254) 
 In addition to being inaccurate, previous studies have overlooked, or worse, exacerbated the 
environmental justice issues of the CRS. Under the current scheme, non-CRS communities are 
burdened with the increased cost of insurance. Arguing that more communities should participate in 
the CRS without addressing this problem or offering any recommendations for communities 







Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 Flooding has taken an average toll of 82 people and caused at least $8 billion in damage 
annually in the past 30 years (National Weather Service, 2014). This devastating effect is expected to 
magnify with the effect of climate change.  The importance of planning to protect people from 
flooding will only increase in the coming years. 
 Through the Community Rating System, the federal government attempted to incentivize 
local governments to plan in such a way that it reduces risk.  However, creating a policy that would 
be effective to all jurisdictions within the country had a number of limitations. This section identifies 
changes that should be made to this incentive system as well as the issues that should be addressed 
in the long term. 
 
7.1 Recommendations for the CRS 
 First, the evaluation of local government efforts should consider the underlying risk of each 
community and be based on risks reduced, rather than simply focusing on the activities conducted. 
The question of subsidizing planning activities aside, if the federal government is to reward any 
community for their planning activities, then these should at least be the communities who benefit 
from the increased resilience.  
 Second, the rewards for activities under the CRS in the form of insurance premium 
discounts should be replaced with other subsidies that benefit the community as a whole. Insurance 
policy holders are not aware of the discounts in the first place, and emphasizing the insurance 
discounts obscures the fact that the activities benefit a wider public, and it is the latter that decision 
makers should be made aware. As this study found, most communities enthusiastically conducting 
mitigation activities are not motivated primarily by the discounts, while the discounts are not large 




not consequential; resources should be spent on other non-material benefits such as technical 
assistance or federal support outside the NFIP system.  
 Third, the administrative process of the CRS should be simplified so as to lower the barrier 
of entry and to reduce the unnecessary burden on local planners. It should also be more flexible and 
less prescriptive; effective mitigation activities vary across jurisdictions and it should be left to the 
local planners to decide which activities to conduct. 
Most importantly, the disproportionate impacts of the CRS need to be addressed; non-participating 
communities should not be forced to subsidize participating communities.  
 
7.2 Limitations of providing economic benefits in exchange for planning 
 Another implication of how communities have responded to the CRS is that incentivizing 
planning activities in exchange for economic gain works for small fixes, but does not function where 
it confronts issues of property rights, sentiment toward government regulations, or the community’s 
future economic development. Often times, the activities that are more controversial tend to be the 
ones effective in the long term. Communities balancing these potential threats and opposition from 
residents will not find small financial incentives attractive enough.  
 The NFIP and CRS being voluntary programs has shielded the federal government from 
claims that these constitute takings of private property. However, considering the rising risks and the 
reluctance or lack of capacity in communities who are located in hazardous areas, the federal 
government should reconsider whether this passive approach is best in serving the public interest, 
not only for specific communities at risk but for all taxpayers whose money is used to provide 






7.3 Embracing complexity: implications for planning research 
 Lastly, the outcomes of this study offers an implication for planning research; there are other 
ways to respect and embrace the complexity of urban phenomena than to build complex models. 
This is by no means to discredit complex quantitative analysis; the critique applies to any attempt, 
either quantitative or qualitative, to model and analyze urban phenomena and inform urban policy. 
When important data cannot be conveniently accommodated in a model, it is the model that should 
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1. What is your position within the town/city/county government? 
 
 
2. Does your town/city/county currently participate in the Community Rating System? 
 




If you answered ‘Yes’ above, please proceed to Question 3 and 4.  
If else, please proceed to Questions 5 and 6. 
 
 











5. How often is participating in the CRS discussed within the town/city/county government? 
 
































Please respond to the following statements below by indicating the degree to which you 
agree or disagree. 
 
 
7. The CRS helps to reduce damage from flooding. 
 





8. The CRS helps to incentivize communities to reduce development in flood-prone areas 
(Special Flood Hazard Areas). 
 













Thank you very much for participating in this interview. 
Please indicate whether you would like to keep your answers anonymous, or waive your 
right to confidentiality. 
 
 
